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Book Review by Randy E. Barnett

Deep-State Constitutionalism
Common Good Constitutionalism, by Adrian Vermeule.
Polity Books, 270 pages, $59.95 (cloth), $19.95 (paper)

T

o appreciate why adrian vermeule’s Common Good Constitutionalism is important, it is necessary to
evaluate not only his proposed approach to
constitutional law but also the book’s political
context.
In 2016, many Republican primary voters
were deeply dissatisfied with the Republican
“establishment.” To their mind, GOP officeholders made campaign promises to enact conservative policies, then failed to deliver. Even
worse, they seemed to prefer approval from
progressive media and intelligentsia to that of
their own constituents. As a result, promised
conservative policies seemed never to be adopted. All the while the Left was succeeding in
its long march through elite media, education,
and corporate institutions. Conservative Republicans—dubbed “Conservative Inc.” or “Big
Con”—were the hapless Washington Generals
to the progressives’ Harlem Globetrotters.
These voters wanted someone who would
eschew political correctness. Someone who
would fight! When they surveyed the 17

candidates on the presidential debate stage,
these voters saw only one who was irreverent
enough, fearless enough—and possibly crazy
enough—to do what he promised and stand
up for them. They viewed the rest as the same
old posers. And so Donald J. Trump, who
had never been a “movement” conservative,
or a conservative of any stripe, and who was
barely a Republican, secured the Republican
nomination. To most everyone’s amazement,
he proceeded to win the presidency.

A

similar dynamic is now playing out within the conservative legal
movement. For years, members of the
conservative legal establishment—in association with the Federalist Society network—assured voters they were vetting prospective
judicial nominees for fealty to conservative
legal principles. To growing numbers of those
voters, subsequent judicial results have been
disappointing.
The galvanizing decision was the 2020
case of Bostock v. Clayton County. Not a conClaremont Review of Books w Spring 2022
Page 33

stitutional case, Bostock concerned the proper
interpretation of Title VII of the U.S. Code,
which makes it “unlawful…for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual…because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”
(emphasis added here and throughout unless otherwise noted). The textual question in
Bostock was whether discriminating against
someone because of “sexual orientation” was
discrimination “because” of “sex.”
In a widely criticized decision, a six-to-three
majority answered yes. Writing the opinion
for the majority was none other than the
Trump-nominated, conservative originalist
Justice Neil Gorsuch. To many on the Right—
but especially to social conservatives—this
seemed like a betrayal of everything they had
been promised. Never mind that Gorsuch
was joined by the four progressive justices
and Chief Justice John Roberts, while the remaining three conservatives, including Justice
Brett Kavanaugh, dissented. Never mind that
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originalist-textualist commentators (like me)
widely criticized Gorsuch’s reasoning. This
legal incident appeared yet another instance
of Lucy snatching the ball away from Charlie
Brown. Or how the progressives would never
be denied. Or how conservative “principles”
seemed never to lead to conservative results.
In response to Bostock, some conservatives
began to question the agenda of the conservative legal movement. They began to reject
originalism as a method of constitutional
interpretation in favor of an explicitly resultsoriented approach. Some of these discontents
have now found their avatar, their Donald
Trump, in Harvard Law professor Adrian
Vermeule.

V

ermeule has had a long, distinguished career as an administrative
law scholar. Although highly respected in his field, he was generally unknown
outside of academia. He was neither a constitutional law theorist, nor an originalist, nor
even a political conservative. He was a mildmannered member of the law professoriate
elite. In 2020, he and his Harvard colleague
Cass Sunstein, the Obama Administration’s
regulatory “czar,” co-authored a book with
the revealing title, Law and Leviathan: Redeeming the Administrative State. Vermeule
was thoroughly establishment, and hardly a
bomb-thrower.
But something happened to Adrian Vermeule. He underwent a (now-public) conversion to Roman Catholicism and has since
associated himself with Catholic integralism,
which embraces the principle that the Catholic faith should be the basis of public law and
public policy within civil society. I will not
dwell on Catholic integralism and what Vermeule has written about it because his new
book is entirely secular in its reasoning and
should be evaluated without concern for any
underlying religious agenda.
I mention the Catholic influence in passing because some have wrongly assumed that
Vermeule’s arguments are religiously based.
And because it helps explain why some social
conservatives, especially younger ones, have
embraced Vermeule as a champion of what he
calls a “rightly ordered” society. He seems to
be one of them, the real deal. Someone who
makes the conservative legal establishment
tremble in fear. Someone with a constitutional approach that, if supported, will deliver
results.
In fairness, Vermeule has located a genuine deficiency in the conservative legal movement that I have criticized for as long as I have
been a part of it. For a variety of reasons, constitutional conservatives—for want of a bet-

ter label—tend to focus almost exclusively on
the proper reading of the “positive law.” They
shy away from any systematic consideration
of justice or morality, deeming these topics to
be outside the proper province of the judiciary.
As a result, many conservative legal academics and jurists dismiss the relevance of natural
law, natural rights, and even the Declaration
of Independence to their theories of law and
legal interpretation.

and 9th Amendment refer. He wrote: “In my
view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the ‘unalienable
Rights’ with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims ‘all men…are endowed
by their Creator.’” And “in my view that right
is also among the ‘othe[r] [rights] retained by
the people’ which the 9th Amendment says
the Constitution’s enumeration of rights ‘shall
not be construed to deny or disparage.’” But,
he continued, “[t]he Declaration of Indepenor example, here is how justice dence, however, is not a legal prescription conAmy Coney Barrett responded to a ferring powers upon the courts; and the Conquestion by Senator Ben Sasse about stitution’s refusal to ‘deny or disparage’ other
the role of the Declaration during her confir- rights is far removed from affirming any one
mation hearing:
of them, and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might
The Declaration of Independence is an
be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws
expression of our ideals, expression of
duly enacted by the people.”
our desire to be free from England. It’s
not law, however…. [T]he Constitution
his de-emphasis of justice and natis our foundational law and our governural rights stems from a preoccupation
ing document. And, while the Declarawith the portion of the Federalist Socition of Independence tells us a lot about
ety mission statement that says “it is emphatihistory and about the roots of our Recally the province and duty of the judiciary
public, it isn’t binding law.
to say what the law is, not what it should be.”
This preoccupation, however, comes at the
My point is not to single out Justice Bar- expense of that part of the mission statement
rett for special criticism. I quote her because which insists that “the state exists to preserve
this instinctive diminution of the Declaration freedom.” This singular focus on the proper
as our founding document is such a fixture of role of judges at the expense of a conception of
thought for some conservatives that it rolled justice based on the natural rights that define
smoothly and eloquently off her tongue.
freedom or liberty is analogous to advocates
The case of Troxel v. Granville (2000) pro- of the free market who focus entirely on its
vides another example. In this case, the Court “efficiency” rather than its justice.
considered whether parents have a constituNow we are witnessing an insurgency in
tional right to raise their own children. If the conservative legal movement by those who
there is such a right, it’s not because it is in advocate what they call a “common good conthe text of the Constitution. Conservatives servatism” that is highly critical of what they
have long been skeptical, if not hostile, to disparagingly label as individualism or “libany claims about unenumerated rights, not- eralism.” They also criticize or diminish the
withstanding the 9th Amendment’s instruc- importance of the individual natural-rights
tion that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitu- foundation of the American theory of govtion of certain rights shall not be construed ernment. A few of these advocates have even
to deny or disparage others retained by the turned on the Federalist Society’s commitpeople.” In his failed 1987 nomination to ment to promoting adherence to the original
the Supreme Court, then-Judge Robert Bork meaning of the Constitution. In all this, their
characterized the 9th Amendment as an intellectual guru is Adrian Vermeule.
“ink blot” that judges cannot read. Bork was
For a time, Vermeule led his followers with
and remains a Federalist Society hero and caustic tweets and the occasional online essay.
martyr.
As a result, it was not uncommon for his critIn Troxel, however, a 6-3 majority—which ics to attribute to him the authoritarian views
included Justice Clarence Thomas—recog- we might expect from a Catholic integralist.
nized such a parental right. They upheld the But now, at last, we have Common Good Conconstitutional right of a mother to deny visita- stitutionalism, by which we can understand
tion privileges sought by the parents of her es- and assess his approach.
tranged husband, her children’s grandparents.
Before getting granular about Vermeule’s
Justice Antonin Scalia—for whom Justice theory, let me begin with one of my concluBarrett clerked—dissented.
sions that some readers may find surprising.
In his opinion, Scalia conceded that this Although I take issue with his particular
right was one to which both the Declaration conception of the common good—which he

F
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repeatedly asserts but does not defend—I
otherwise generally agree with the commongood, natural-law superstructure that Vermeule spends the first two chapters describing. This is because I am not only a naturalrights theorist, which aligns me both with
the founders and with the Republicans who
gave us the Reconstruction amendments. I
am also an adherent to the AristotelianThomist conception of natural law, of the
sort explicated by my teacher and mentor,
Henry B. Veatch.

P

roperly conceived, this commongood, natural-law superstructure is a
useful corrective to the conservative legal movement’s exclusive focus on the positive
law, which leads to Justice Barrett’s marginalization of the Declaration and Justice Scalia’s
marginalization of the 9th Amendment. But
subsequently, Vermeule makes a few theoretical moves whose significance readers may not
notice.
None of these moves is original, and most
are made by claiming the authority of the
scholars who made them—especially Ronald Dworkin (with whom I studied)—rather
than defending them with arguments. Indeed,
Vermeule affirms as much: “I draw on jurisprudential ideas as necessary, I have nothing

original to say in that regard.” It is somehow
fitting that Vermeule’s argument is largely an
appeal to authority.
For those expecting him to defend a social
conservative platform, however, these moves
lead to some unexpected—and decidedly progressive—results. For one thing, Vermeule
rejects the U.S. system of federalism based on
dual sovereignty in favor of a European concept of “subsidiarity.” This approach purports
to leave to local authorities what is within
their competence, while governing at a higher
level only when necessary. But the decision
of how to allocate power lies solely with the
higher authorities.
With federalism, dual sovereignty creates
a realm of state authority that is properly outside the jurisdiction of the national government, whatever its preferences may be. We
have recently witnessed the importance of
dual sovereignty during COVID, when the
federal government’s power to impose nationwide health measures on localities was thankfully limited. State governors had the power
to frame a diversity of policies, which enabled
us to compare more effective with less effective measures. States like Florida were free to
adopt a more open approach than lockdown
states like New York. And crucially, Americans were able to vote with their feet by mov-

ing to the jurisdictions which, in their view,
had better public policy. Vermeule’s European approach would deprive us of this freedom, and the public health benefits that have
resulted.

A

s vermeule wrote elsewhere, “i
see no objection in principle to the
President’s vaccine mandate, as a matter of political morality.” These principles of
political morality
should be brought to bear in the interpretation of executive authority. The relevant legal materials are capacious and,
in places, vague. They can and should
be interpreted to allow the President
and his agents broad leeway to act, and
to act swiftly.

As this stance exemplifies, Vermeule endorses the administrative state as the institution best charged with implementing the natural law. This should come as no surprise to
anyone familiar with his work as an administrative law scholar but may well surprise those
conservatives who view him as their champion. Vermeule does not (with one odd exception) propose that judges impose the common
good. Instead, he favors a radical deference to
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administrative state expertise to pursue the
common good. In other words, post-conversion Vermeule has adopted a political-moral
superstructure in service of the same legal
agenda that pre-conversion Vermeule favored
on utilitarian or pragmatic grounds.
The exception to his reliance on judicial
deference is his urging the Supreme Court
to modify its doctrines governing who has
“standing” to sue the government in order “to
promote environmental goods through law—
including through litigation.” More broadly,
“standing” should “be reshaped precisely to encourage plaintiffs representing the public interest rather than litigating private grievances.”
Why the judicial deference he claims to be a
part of “the classical law” is inappropriate here,
as it is elsewhere, is not explained.
Of course, Vermeule’s biggest splash has
been his rejection of “originalism.” But he rejects a straw man version of it that virtually
no originalist has accepted for the past 20
years or more. When responding to critics,
however, it becomes clear that he actually embraces originalism to guard against characterizations of his approach as a version of living
constitutionalism.

I

n common good constitutionalism,
Vermeule spends much of the book describing features of what he calls the “classical law” that he thinks should be restored.
On the first page, he appears to define “the
classical legal tradition” as “the ius commune,
the classical European synthesis of Roman
law, canon law, and local civil law.” The ius
commune, he says, “was heavily influential in
England, in a somewhat variant form; both
English and continental streams influenced
Americans right from the beginning, throughout the nineteenth century and well into the
twentieth.”
He then tells us that the classical tradition
“openly embraces the view that law is ordered
to the common good, explains why it is law’s
nature to be so ordered, and claims that the
positive law based on the will of the civil lawmaker, while worthy of great respect in its
sphere, is contained within a larger objective
order of legal principles and can only be interpreted in accordance with those principles.”
Vermeule identifies what he says should be
“the master principle of our public law”: “that
all officials have a duty, and corresponding authority, to promote the common good—albeit
in a manner consistent with the requirements
of their particular roles.” There is nothing objectionable here, though this last qualification
plays an important role to which I will return.
Under the “classical law,” the “ruling authority always act[s] through reasoned ordinances

conducing to the common good, to public
rather than private interest.” So far, so good.
Vermeule does not deny the existence, and
presumptively binding nature, of positive
law—what he also calls “posited” law. Positive
law, he says, “represents a legitimate specification by the public authority of general principles of legal morality that need concrete embodiment, the specification of local rules that
take account of local conditions.” Vermeule
labels this process “determination” or determinatio: “the process of giving content to a general principle drawn from a higher source of law,
making it concrete in application to particular
local circumstances or problems.”

T

he need for determination “arises
when principles of justice are general
and thus do not specifically dictate
particular legal rules, or when those principles seem to conflict and must be mutually
accommodated or balanced.” For Vermeule,
the common good
is a type of justification for public action.
It does not, by itself, prescribe any particular legal institutions or rules. Leaving aside cases of intrinsic evils, which
place deontological side constraints on
all public and private action, the common good must be applied to a set of
particular circumstances by means of
the faculty of prudential judgment (emphasis in original).

Here again, I am with him.
In The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the
Rule of Law (1998), I made exactly the same
claim about the need for the rule of law to
devise doctrines to implement the abstract
requirements of justice. These legal precepts—consisting of both specific rules and
more abstract principles à la Dworkin who
famously drew this distinction—are not logically deducible from abstract principles of
justice. They are adopted by agreement or
“convention.” The most commonly invoked example of this is determining on which side of
the road traffic will flow—when the natural
law dictates only that it must be on one side
or the other.
Still, to be binding in conscience, I maintain, such rules of law should not conflict with
abstract principles of justice, which are essential to achieving the common good. As I wrote,
“To render abstract principles specific enough
to govern conduct requires some process of
arriving at a conventional choice of precepts.
Although such precepts may not be deduced
from abstract principles, they can run afoul
of these principles” and be “inconsistent with
Claremont Review of Books w Spring 2022
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the requirements of justice or the rule of law.”
In sum, “[a]bstract natural rights and rule of
law principles exclude wrong answers rather
than definitively establish right ones.” Or, as
Vermeule puts it, “The common good in its
capacity as the fundamental end of temporal
government shapes and constrains, but does
not fully determine, the nature of institutions
and the allocation of lawmaking authority between and among them in any given polity.”
Vermeule also acknowledges the importance of putting these conventional rules in
writing. The “right and duty of the public authority to determine or specify the content of
the positive law imply that the judges or other
officials who determine the meaning of law at
the point of application are duty-bound to follow a kind of textualism, at least presumptively.” In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas Aquinas
maintains that the “human law” is known not
by reason, but by promulgation. Later, we will
see how this “duty” to “follow a kind of textualism” leads Vermeule to embrace originalism,
while adamantly purporting to reject it.

H

ow then does vermeule define
“the common good”? His first definition is unobjectionable: “the common good is well-ordered peace, justice, and
abundance in political community.” Moreover,
he also stipulates that the “end of the community is ultimately to promote the good of
individuals.” But, at the same time, he insists
that “the ultimate genuinely common good of
political life is the happiness or flourishing of
the community, the well-ordered life in the
polis.” He then denies “that ‘private’ happiness, or even the happiness of family life, is
the real aim” and that the common good “is
merely what supplies the lawful peace, justice,
and stability needed to guarantee that private
happiness.” Instead, “the highest felicity in the
temporal sphere is itself the common life of
the well-ordered community, which includes
those other foundational goods but transcends them as well.”
Space does not allow me to take issue with
this formulation of the common good and,
truth be told, it does little work in leading to
Vermeule’s conclusions. I will confine myself
to observing that Vermeule fails to appreciate
the role that individual natural rights play in
assuring that what is claimed to be the “common good” is genuinely common to all. The
protection of natural rights is essential to the
achievement of the common good, not only
because the good of individuals is an end in itself, but because such rights constrain the ageold sacrifice of the individual for the greater
good. How best to identify and protect these
rights is a separate matter.

mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
Vermeule is right to reject a conception
of the common good as “the summation of
a number of private goods, no matter how
great that number or how intense the preference for those goods may be.” Or “maximizing individual autonomy or minimizing
the abuse of power.” Or “strictly aggregativeutilitarian arrangements.” Or “maximizing
aggregate utility.”

B

ut when all these formulations
are rightly rejected, there is still the
small matter of ensuring that the common good is truly common. That individual
flourishing will not be sacrificed on the altar
of the supposed “flourishing” of the group.
Aquinas himself saw the need for some restrictions on state power when he affirmed
that the human law ought “not forbid all vices,
from which the virtuous abstain, but only the
more grievous vices, from which it is possible
for the majority to abstain.” And he came
close to acknowledging what later came to
be viewed as natural rights when he said the
vices human law ought to forbid are “chiefly
those that are to the hurt of others, without
the prohibition of which human society could
not be maintained: thus, human law prohibits
murder, theft and such like.”
Moreover, Vermeule fails to acknowledge
the degree to which, although human flourishing requires virtue, such virtue does not
consist in merely obeying the commands of
an authority mandating right conduct. Virtue must be internalized or habituated so it
becomes, as it were, one’s second nature. Because of this, a realm of individual choice or
freedom is essential to the achievement of the
virtue that leads to what Aristotle called eudaimonia, human flourishing or the good life.
A full treatment of his conception of the
common good and human flourishing would
require a deeper dive than I can attempt now.
But on this issue, as on others, Vermeule is
content to stipulate his conception of the
common good, rather than provide a substantive defense of it or respond to alternative conceptions of the common good within what he
calls the “classical” tradition.
Vermeule does acknowledge the need for
some constraint on the state’s power to coerce
in the name of the common good. “In America, the classical tradition held that so long as
determinations are made within the jurisdictional competence of public bodies, for legitimate ends, and on rational grounds, they are a
matter for the public authority, not the courts.”
He repeatedly asserts that courts should oversee lawmakers, to see, first, “whether the authority has acted within its sphere of competence”; second, “whether it has pursued a rea-

sonable public purpose”; and third, “whether
the means it has chosen are rational.”

I

agree with him that this was the
traditional approach, and it is the one I favor as well. But Vermeule fails to note that
this approach was abandoned by the Warren
Court in the 1955 case of Williamson v. Lee
Optical. There, the Court adopted the toothless standard known as “rational basis” scrutiny. The label “rational basis” suggests that
this approach is staying within the “classical”
or traditional requirement that laws not be irrational, arbitrary, or discriminatory. But this
is illusory.
The standard adopted in Lee Optical required only that there be a conceivable basis
that legislators and regulators might have had
for enacting a law. These reasons can be made
up by the government after the fact, and judges are obliged to make up a conceivable basis
for the law if the government doesn’t. All constitutional lawyers know that legislation will
always satisfy such review.

Vermeule fails to
appreciate the role that
individual natural rights
play in assuring that
what is claimed to be
the “common good” is
genuinely common to all.
One of Vermeule’s key moves is to defend
against the charge of granting dictatorial
powers to the administrative state by repeatedly invoking the traditional or “classical”
approach to judges policing arbitrary laws.
But he then quietly adopts the toothless
“conceivable basis” approach to escape from
any such constraint. As he puts it, if “the
determinations of authority exceed public
jurisdiction, are aimed at no reasonably conceivable public benefit, or adopt plainly arbitrary means, then judges should invalidate
them.” Or again, “if the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be
fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must
be allowed to control.” Readers may easily
miss this deflection of the classical standard.
Without it, he and I would again be in basic
accord.
Finally, there is Vermeule’s now well
known “rejection” of originalism, which
turns out to be an endorsement of originalism in everything but name. Following
Claremont Review of Books w Spring 2022
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Dworkin, he insists that originalism must
take one of two forms: “Is the ‘meaning’ the
specific applications the relevant actors expected would result from the enacted language…
or instead the abstract semantic content of the
words they enacted?” He labels the first “specific expectations originalism” and the second “abstract originalism.” He then claims
that “originalism has no internal theoretical
resources with which to pin down the choice
between these two.” Here he commits the
fallacy of the excluded middle—that there
are two and only these two options—something any Aristotelian-Thomist who is sensitive to the mean between extremes should
strive to avoid.

T

his dworkinian binary does not
reflect how linguistic meaning works.
First, the “specific expectations” originalism that Vermeule rejects is the one first
constructed by Dworkin in a review of Robert Bork’s The Tempting of America (1990).
Although it was a distortion of Bork’s approach, in fairness, specific-applications
originalism did reflect the precursor of originalism found in Raoul Berger’s 1977 book,
Government by Judiciary. But regardless of
whether it fit Bork, Dworkin’s reconstruction bears no relation to the modern originalism of the past 30 or more years since
Dworkin wrote.
Whatever their internal disagreements, all
modern originalists reject “original expected
applications” as the meaning of the text—
though they allow that expected applications
may be evidence of that meaning. Those who
draft constitutions or statutes tend to use
words whose public meaning will accomplish
their specific ends. But the meaning of their
words is not reduceable to those ends. This
would be akin to reducing the meaning of the
text of Common Good Constitutionalism to the
religious and moral results Vermeule hoped
to achieve by writing it.
Second, with respect to “abstract originalism,” all modern originalists recognize that
the public meaning of words depends upon
the social context in which they are uttered.
How abstract or particular that meaning is
in context cannot merely be asserted or assumed; it must be shown by evidence. This is
what originalist scholarship has been doing
for three decades.
In truth, Vermeule’s strident rejection of
originalism is more polemical than real. To
his credit, he acknowledges the two fundamental premises that all genuinely originalist
theories share in common: first, “that constitutional meaning was fixed at the time of the
Constitution’s enactment (or that of relevant
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amendments),” and second, “that this fixed
meaning ought to constrain constitutional
practice by judges and other officials.” The two
major tenets of the family of theories known
as modern originalism are the “fixation thesis”
that the language of the Constitution had a
fixed meaning when used, and the “constraint
principle” that this meaning ought to constrain constitutional actors. These two tenets
are what distinguish an originalist from a living constitutionalist approach.

Y

et this is exactly the position
Vermeule asserts in response to the
claim that he is a living constitutionalist, albeit of a peculiar sort—that he adheres
to what Judge William Pryor called “living
common-goodism.” In an essay written with
Conor Casey in the Spring 2022 issue of the
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy: Per
Curiam, “Argument by Slogan,” Vermeule
responds that common good constitutionalism “does not alter the semantic meaning
of concepts and principles…nor does it take
the semantic meaning to be entirely open
to any and all changing applications and
moral novelties that current generations may
dream up.” Living constitutionalists like the
University of Chicago Law School’s David
Strauss deny both these claims. They assert

that the meaning of the text evolves or changes over time. They then claim that, when this
happens, it is not the original meaning but
the evolved meaning that is binding on constitutional actors.
Having accepted the two basic tenets of
originalism in order to deny he is a living constitutionalist, however, Vermeule then makes
a Dworkinian move to escape the constraint
that originalism imposes. He claims that this
fixed meaning is so abstract or “thin” that it
provides no barrier to judges and others employing what he has elsewhere referred to as
its “majestic generalities” to pursue their conception of the common good. But the claim
that the text’s original meaning is this “abstract” or “thin” must be established with evidence, not merely stipulated.
Like most non-originalist law professors,
however, Vermeule is an armchair originalist
who simply asserts, rather than proves, that
this fixed constitutional meaning was highly
abstract. The favorite examples of such allegedly abstract terms are “cruel and unusual
punishment” in the 8th Amendment, “due
process” in the 5th and 14th Amendments,
and “equal protection” in the 14th. This then
enables armchair originalists to forgo the
text and pursue their agendas, whatever they
may be. In Vermeule’s case, the agenda is the

direct pursuit of the common good as he defines it.

B

ut granting that the original
meaning of some terms in the Constitution is more abstract than others does not end the constraint imposed on
constitutional actors by originalism. As Vermeule acknowledges, modern originalists
have developed the distinction between constitutional “interpretation” and “construction”
to address this issue. Interpretation is the activity of identifying the original communicated content of the text (in context). Construction is the activity of applying that meaning in
particular cases. This activity often requires
the adoption of constitutional doctrines that
are consistent with, but not deducible from,
the text’s original meaning. Astute readers
will recognize the latter is an instance of what
Vermeule calls determinatio.
Crucially, the size of the “construction zone”
will depend on the thickness of the meaning
discovered by interpretation. For example,
John Stinneford of the University of Florida
Levin College of Law has presented compelling evidence that the phrase “cruel and unusual” punishment referred to punishments
that are both cruel and novel, thereby greatly
defining and limiting its scope. A cruel pun-
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ishment is not unconstitutional unless it is
also new. Since most punishments can be considered cruel, constitutionality turns on the
much-easier-to-ascertain element of novelty.
And, as Evan Bernick and I show in The
Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit (2021), the meanings of “due process” and “equal protection”
are far thicker than armchair originalists
assert. For one thing, the text is itself more
specific, referring to “the due process of law,”
and “the equal protection of the laws.” For another, as Justice Clarence Thomas’s deep dive
earlier this year in U.S. v. Vaello Madero into
the original meaning of the privileges or immunities of “citizenship” illustrates, the public meaning of these phrases becomes thicker
still when the context in which they were enacted is examined.

O

not wrong about this. But it is the teleology
of “We the People” who adopted the original Constitution and later its amendments,
not the teleology of their servants who are
charged with faithfully applying it.
Being faithful to the fixed meaning of the
letter of the text—which Vermeule says judges “are duty-bound to follow”—requires constitutional actors to put their own conception
of the common good to one side in favor of the
spirit in which the provisions they are applying were adopted. Like original public meaning, identifying this spirit is a historical, not a
normative, inquiry. In our 14th Amendment
book, we separately identify these original
ends, objects, principles, and purposes, distinct from the text’s original meaning, and
then give examples of their application.
What about the issue of “positivism”? For
some 20 years, I have maintained that original
meaning is to be followed to the extent that
the positive law in our written Constitution
is morally legitimate. By morally legitimate, I
mean that the structure it establishes is “good
enough” to produce laws the substance of
which are—in the words of Aquinas— “binding in conscience” on the persons whose obedience is demanded.
And I have argued that constitutional actors are morally bound to adhere to the text’s
original meaning—and to apply that meaning
in a manner that is faithful to the original design—because they receive their powers only
in return for their oath to faithfully uphold
“this Constitution”—the one written on parchment and housed in the National Archives.
Vermeule dismisses arguments based on
the oath as circular, assuming what must
be shown about the meaning of the Constitution. But this doesn’t apply to my claim,
which is premised on a theory of linguistic
meaning—what meaning is—as well as a
theory of how that meaning ought faithfully
to be implemented.

f course, stinneford’s or our
historical-linguistic claim could be
wrong. But refuting our claim requires an examination of the evidence we
present. It cannot be refuted by asserting a
false binary between a paper-thin abstract
meaning on the one hand and original expected applications on the other. Those who have
made the effort have almost uniformly found
that the actual original meaning of phrases
like “due process of law” is far thicker than
that postulated by Adrian Vermeule from the
ivory tower or Justice Anthony Kennedy from
the bench.
Like progressive “living originalist” Yale
Law School professor Jack Balkin, Vermeule
assumes that whatever is happening in the
construction zone is unconstrained by originalism, so legal authorities are free to adopt
whatever common-good principles they think
are morally best. In our 2018 article, “The
Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of
Originalism,” published by the Georgetown
University Law Journal, Evan Bernick and I
propose that the construction zone is itself
constrained by original ends, objects, purposhroughout the book, vermeule
es, principles, or functions of the provisions
contrasts his approach to that of “libbeing applied. This is a teleological inquiry of
ertarians” and “libertarian-originalists.”
the sort Vermeule says is inevitable, and he is For example, he claims that “[l]ibertarian-
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originalists have rather notoriously emphasized only the ‘blessings of liberty,’” which he
then dismisses as “a false conception even of
those ‘blessings.’” And yet there is no citation
to any source. To whom might he be referring? How many “libertarian-originalists” are
there?
Given my knowledge of the players in the
realm of constitutional theory, I’m so vain I
truly think this criticism is about me. But,
to my knowledge, I have never relied on the
“blessings of liberty” in the Preamble to interpret the original meaning of the text that follows. And as should be clear by now, I hold to
a decidedly different view than that which he
attributes to “libertarian-originalists.”
Indeed, I do now, and have always, believed
in a genuinely common good. The hard questions then are how that common good is to
be defined in theory and achieved in practice.
Vermeule needs to show how his conception
of the common good, and not some other normative ends, will actually be achieved by the
administrative state he would empower to implement the natural law. But this is never even
attempted in Common Good Constitutionalism.
A serious work of constitutional theory by
a serious constitutional theorist should confront the strongest version of the theories to
which he objects. In so many ways, Vermeule
fails in this basic duty of a scholar. At virtually
every opportunity, he makes things easy on
himself. But Vermeule is not really operating
as a scholar; he is operating at the level of constitutional polemics. In that realm, it is not
clear that the kinds of objections I offer here
will make any difference to his new followers.
But these objections should make a difference
to those who are serious about pursuing the
common good.
Randy E. Barnett is the Patrick Hotung Professor of Constitutional Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, where he directs
the Georgetown Center for the Constitution.
He is the coauthor (with Evan D. Bernick) of
The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Its Letter and Spirit (Harvard
University Press).
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